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 Julius Caesar - BG Book 5 Chapter 24 - 38 XXIV.--The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of the Gauls held at Samarobriva, because the corn that year had not prospered in Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his army in its winter-quarters, differently from the former years, and to distribute the legions among several states: one of them he gave to C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the Morini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. Roscius, into those of the Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus among the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationed three in Belgium; over these he appointed M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion which he had raised last on the other side of the Po, and five cohorts, he sent amongst the Eburones, the greatest portion of whom lie between the Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the government of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. He ordered Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take the command of these soldiers. The legions being distributed in this manner, he thought he could most easily remedy the scarcity of corn; and yet the winter-quarters of all these legions (except that which he had given to L. Roscius to be led into the most peaceful and tranquil neighbourhood) were comprehended within [about] 100 miles. He himself in the meanwhile, until he had stationed the legions and knew that the several winter-quarters were fortified, determined to stay in Gaul. XXV.--There was among the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very high rank, whose ancestors had held the sovereignty in his state. To him Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in consideration of his prowess and attachment towards him, because in all his wars he had availed himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies had killed him when in the third year of his reign, many even of his own state being openly promoters [of that act]. This event is related to Caesar. He fearing, because several were involved in the act, that the state might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to proceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter there, and arrest and send to him the persons by whose instrumentality he should discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the meantime, he was apprised by all the lieutenants and questors to whom he had assigned the legions, that they had arrived in winter-quarters, and that the place for the quarters was fortified. XXVI.--About fifteen days after they had come into winter-quarters, the beginning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and Cativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom, and had conveyed corn into our winter-quarters, induced by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, excited their people, and after having suddenly assailed the soldiers, engaged in procuring wood, came with a large body to attack the camp. When our men had speedily taken up arms and had ascended the rampart, and sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors in a cavalry action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off their troops from the assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men should go forward to a conference, [alleging] that they had some things which they desired to say respecting the common interest, by which they trusted their disputes could be removed. XXVII.--C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and with him Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who already on previous occasions had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference: before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed that for Caesar's kindness towards him he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbours; and because his own son and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, when sent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in slavery and in chains; and that he had not done that which he had done in regard to the attacking of the camp, either by his own judgment or desire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that his government was of that nature, that the people had as much of authority over him as he over the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the war was this --that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the Gauls; that he could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution of Gaul; that that day was appointed for the storming of all Caesar's winter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to the relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, especially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their common freedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism [he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that he warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to consult for his and his soldiers' safety; that a large force of the Germans had been hired and had passed the Rhine; that it would arrive in two days; that it was for them to consider whether they thought fit, before the nearest people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers when drawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other rather more; that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give them a safe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was both consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from the winter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his obligations." XXVIII.--Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had heard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those things were spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to be disregarded; and they were especially influenced by this consideration, that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble state of the Eburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their own accord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a, great controversy arises among them. L. Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion "that nothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from the camp without Caesar's orders"; they declared, "that any forces of the Germans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter-quarters; that this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the first assault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting many wounds upon them; that they were not distressed for corn; that in the meantime relief would come both from the nearest winter-quarters and from Caesar"; lastly, they put the query, "what could be more undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting the most important affairs on the authority of an enemy?" XXIX.--In opposition to those things Titurius exclaimed, "That they would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disaster had been received in the neighbouring winter-quarters; that the opportunity for deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the measure of slaying Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us; that he did not regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the Rhine was near; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that after having received so many defeats she was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters being extinguished." Lastly, "who would persuade himself of this, that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds? That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing very formidable, they would go without danger to the nearest legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in despatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was." XXX.--This discussion having been held on the two sides, when opposition was offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers, "Prevail," said Sabinus, "if so you wish it"; and he said it with a louder voice, that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him; "nor am I the person among you," he said, "who is most powerfully alarmed by the danger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if any thing disastrous shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at your hands; these, who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hence with the nearest winter-quarters, may encounter the common condition of war with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated far from the rest, perish either by the sword or by famine." XXXI.--They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that "they do not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension and obstinacy; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought and approved of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the other hand, they saw no security in dissension." The matter is prolonged by debate till midnight. At last Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent; the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will march at day-break; the remainder of the night is spent without sleep, since every soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carry with him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, he would be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why they could not stay without danger, and how that danger would be increased by the fatigue of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day they quit the camp, in a very extended line and with a very large amount of baggage, in such a manner as men who were convinced that the advice was given by Ambiorix, not as an enemy, but as most friendly [towards them]. XXXII.--But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of their intended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiring to rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a suitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for the arrival of the Romans; and when the greater part of the line of march had descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presented themselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass the rear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a place exceedingly disadvantageous to our men. XXXIII.--Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothing beforehand, was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging his troops; these very things, however, he did timidly and in such a manner that all resources seemed to fail him: which generally happens to those who are compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, who had reflected that these things might occur on the march, and on that account had not been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the common safety in no respect; both in addressing and encouraging the soldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle those of a soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easily perform everything by themselves, and provide what was to be done in each place, by reason of the length of the line of march, they ordered [the officers] to give the command that they should leave the baggage and form themselves into an orb, which measure, though in a contingency of that nature it was not to be condemned, still turned out unfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of our soldiers and rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared that this was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides that happened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the most part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from the baggage whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled with uproar and lamentation. XXXIV.--But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the ranks "that no man should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them consider that all things depended on their victory." Our men were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valour, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, orders the command to be issued that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again. XXXV.--Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort had quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled very precipitately. In the meantime, that part of the Roman army, of necessity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their open flank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreated and by those who stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wished to keep their place, neither was an opportunity left for valour, nor could they, being crowded together, escape the weapons cast by so large a body of men. Yet, though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and] having received many wounds, they withstood the enemy, and, a great portion of the day being spent, though they fought from day-break till the eighth hour, they did nothing which was unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before had been chief centurion, a brave man and one of great authority, is pierced with a javelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, is slain while he assists his son when surrounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, is wounded full in the mouth by a sling. XXXVI.--Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he had perceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and his soldiers. He, when addressed, replied, "If he wished to confer with him, it was permitted; that he hoped what pertained to the safety of the soldiers could be obtained from the people; that to him however certainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to that effect." He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it would appear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying] that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers' safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in that perseveres. XXXVII.--Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at the time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to follow him, and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw down his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to do the same. In the meantime, while they treat upon the terms, and a longer debate than necessary is designedly entered into by Ambiorix, being surrounded by degrees, he is slain. Then they according to their custom shout out "Victory," and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men, break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together with the greater part of the soldiers; the rest betake themselves to the camp from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petrosidius, the standard bearer, when he was overpowered by the great number of the enemy, threw the eagle within the entrenchments and is himself slain while fighting with the greatest courage before the camp. They with difficulty sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they all to a man destroy themselves in the night. A few escaping from the battle, make their way to Labienus at winter-quarters, after wandering at random through the woods, and inform him of these events. Stratagem Stratagem implies a concealed intention, and therefore is opposed to straightforward dealing, in the same way as wit is the opposite of direct proof. It has therefore nothing in common with means of persuasion, of self- interest, of force, but a great deal to do with deceit, because that likewise conceals its object. It is itself a deceit as well when it is done, but still it differs from what is commonly called deceit, in this respect that there is no direct breach of word. The deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person himself whom he is deceiving to commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into ONE result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes. We may therefore say, as nit is a sleight of hand with ideas and conceptions, so stratagem is a sleight of hand with actions. At first sight it appears as if Strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem; and that, with all the real and apparent changes which the whole character of War has undergone since the time of the Greeks, this term still points to its real nature. If we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the blow, the battle itself, and look upon Strategy as the art of using this means with skill, then besides the forces of the character, such as burning ambition which always presses like a spring, a strong will which hardly bends &c. &c., there seems no subjective quality so suited to guide and inspire strategic activity as stratagem. The general tendency to surprise, treated of in the foregoing chapter, points to this conclusion, for there is a degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise. But however much we feel a desire to see the actors in War outdo each other in hidden activity, readiness, and stratagem, still we must admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history, and have rarely been able to work their way to the surface from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances. The explanation of this is obvious, and it is almost identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter. Strategy knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with the measures which relate to it. It has no concern, like ordinary life, with transactions which consist merely of words--that is, in expressions, declarations, &c. But these, which are very inexpensive, are chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in those he practises upon. That which there is like it in War, plans and orders given merely as make-believers, false reports sent on purpose to the enemy--is usually of so little effect in the strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular cases which offer of themselves, therefore cannot be regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from the leader. But such measures as carrying out the arrangements for a battle, so far as to impose upon the enemy, require a considerable expenditure of time and power; of course, the greater the impression to be made, the greater the expenditure in these respects. And as this is usually not given for the purpose, very few demonstrations, so-called, in Strategy, effect the object for which they are designed. In fact, it is dangerous to detach large forces for any length of time merely for a trick, because there is always the risk of its being done in vain, and then these forces are wanted at the decisive point. The chief actor in War is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth, and therefore he has no desire to play at tricks of agility. The bitter earnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct action that there is no room for that game. In a word, the pieces on the strategical chess-board want that mobility which is the element of stratagem and subtility. The conclusion which we draw, is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful quality for a General than craftiness, although that also does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of necessary qualities of the heart, which is only too often the case. But the weaker the forces become which are under the command of Strategy, so much the more they become adapted for stratagem, so that to the quite feeble and little, for whom no prudence, no sagacity is any longer sufficient at the point where all art seems to forsake him, stratagem offers itself as a last resource. The more helpless his situation, the more everything presses towards one single, desperate blow, the more readily stratagem comes to the aid of his boldness. Let loose from all further calculations, freed from all concern for the future, boldness and stratagem intensify each other, and thus collect at one point an infinitesimal glimmering of hope into a single ray, which may likewise serve to kindle a flame. From: CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ "ON WAR" BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL, CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM An interpretation “The case Sabinus and where is the corpse?” Attempt of an interpretation to Caesars text from the b. G.V 24-38. Drama with at least three acts 1. Exposition (introduction/Protase) The acting persons are introduced and the dramatic conflict is announced. 2. Complication (increase/Epitase) Rising action - with exciting moment (Catastase) The situation is intensified. 3. Peripetie (reversal of the luck circumstances of the hero) The action reaches its high point (Climax). 4. Retardation (slowing down) Falling action - with retarding (dilatory, delaying, slowing down) moments. The action slows down, over in a phase of the highest tension on the forthcoming disaster in addition-works. 5. Disaster or Lysis/Dénouement A) Arriving the disaster b) All conflicts are solved 1. Prolog exposition (introduction/Protase) The acting persons are introduced, the dramatic conflict will be announced. Usual suspects (in ranking): Caius Iulius Caesar = Roman, author and director Indotiumarus = Treveri master leader and rebel Ambiorix = Eburonean war-leader Eburones = ethnical group between the rivers Maas and Rhine Quintus Titurius Sabinus = Roman Legat and at all debt Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta = Roman Legat (the good Roman) Gallic Eburoneans (all had a name) Roman Legionaers (all had a name) Roman Spanish Cavallery Gaius Arpinius = Roman knight and interpreter Titus Balventius = Centurio Lucius Petrosidius = eagle-carrier of the Legion Sabinus Gnaeus Pompeius = interpreter Quintus Iunius = interpreter and Spanish Roman unit train farmhands, slaves, wantable women and dealers (Paria) Mules Crows Time: Latelatène, autumn 54 b.C. 2. Complication (increase/Epitase) Rising action - with exciting moment (Catastase) The situation is intensified. The scene According to the b. G. the winter camp of the Sabinus/Cotta was laying nearby a fastened location (Id castelli nomen est) named Atuatuca, which located centrically in the residential area of the gallic Eburones. This area is put between Rhine and Maas by the b. G.: The rivers Maas and Rhine form the thighs of a triangle with the northern point in the muzzle delta to the North Sea, with the long basis of the Ardennes/the Eifel in the south. The Maas, which goes from the today's D-Goch to south southwest, bends with B-Lüttich to the west. The area between for instance B-Lüttich to D-Goch, from there to the Rhine (Dormagen) downward to D-Remagen and again after B-Lüttich, with an indefinite extension to the west (B-Tongeren?) beyond the Maas, is to be accepted as the master area of the Eburones. The fortress Atuatuca is playing no more important role, it concerns “only” a geographical allocation for the winter camp of the Sabinus. The debutants With a desired strength of approx. 5,000 soldiers (XV.?) Legion plus 5 Cohortes (approx. 2,500 men), plus officers and officials is to be counted a crew between 8.000 and 10.000 humans. The b. G. mentions only once a legions strength: two legions with 7.000 men as relief to the camp Cicero, whose camp was attacked about one week after the Atuatuca-combat. If this should indicate the nominal strength to a Legion of Caesar at this time, the 15 Cohortes of Sabinus counted about 5,500 men. We take this as testified value which can be taken as some house-number. Latter number could mean that about 10,000 humans were involved. That corresponds to a meagerly visited secondary legion soccer game (the comparison limps, but the estimated reader may imagine the combat much better). According to today's customs the gallic army was divided into (based from the highest level of the command structure): State: rom. Republic Ministry: rom. Senate Army: The Gallic legions (8 - 10 legions) Division: Legion federation under a commander (3 legions) Brigade: Legion (5000 men) Battalion: Cohorte (500 men) Company: Centurie (100 men) Group: Tent community (8 men) The commander in chief of the Gallic army was called Caius Iulius Caesar, a Proconsul of the Republican State of Rome in the area of today's Italy. Caesar was subordinate to the senate in Rome and leaded 10 officers (Legates), who led, depending upon employment, the 8 - 10 legions in Gallia. Titus Labienus was preferential officer of Caesars in the gallic wars. The infantry consisted pioneers, carpenters, bricklayer, baker, soldier, etc. of recruited Roman citizens. The republican-roman army had been reorganized by Marius. The camps had still no standardized forms, as Augustus had interspersed it. The caesarischen camps, as F-Alésia proved, could be asymmetrically to the area adapted, had however, as in all Roman camps, two way centerlines and one gate each in the places where the axles the camp barrier met and cut. The excavations around the camp formed a barrier of different height and width. On the barrier a Palisade was set consisting of wood and towers. The stage Free areas permitted a tactically favorable development of its combat equipment to the Cohortes. Dealers and native ones placed themselfes out of the back gate. The Castellum of Atuatuca is not to be added with the winter camp Sabinus. An indication from the b. G. for the approximate size the camp Cicero in the nervian area is interesting. b. G. book V, 42: The Nervians put a 15,000 foot fence around the camp of Cicero (which as contemporaneous applies with the camp Sabinus) a Roman foot (1 rom. Foot = 0.30 cm) long barrier and ditch (for instance 900m x 1.300m). This corresponds to an extent of for instance 4.500m. With a rather oval-rectangular camp form can be accepted, which amounted to similar the actual camp for instance 700m x 1.000m. A value for the inner surface should be more precise. Winter camps had been settled outside from localities and stayed there for several months. The infantry slept in leather tents with 8 men in the group. The nutrition of so many humans requires a good logistics and resources. The Legion nourished itself by obligation supplies of grain and cattle on the part of the native population. The season of the described events was autumn and the harvests had brought in. Good plough land should have to be found in the proximity. Meadows for the horses and open spaces are a condition. Possible forest as firewood resources increase the attractiveness of the location. Water was one of most important resources. The strategic situation should be so selected, which fast troop movements without large expenditure could be made into different directions. The “bad ones” Eburoneans did not possess Oppida = cities according to b. G. The name “Atuatuca” could mean the local term for a fastened place, approximately in the sense of approximately “A-Thuat-ucam”, of “refuge”, “for people”. The celtic word “thuat” does mean a special landscape. This interpretation could explain, why because this name so often seems to appear in the antique Euregio region. The mention of a gallic attachment in the closer surroundings of the Sabinus camp could mean completely simply “castellum” = a “Atuatuca” and not the name of a gallic place, as for instance Lugdunum (F-Lyon). The b. G. Liber II 29 writes over the tribe of the Atuatuci: “… they were descendants of the Cimbern and Teutonen, which on their course into our province and to Italy their have and property, which they could lead or carry not with itself, on this side of the Rhine in security brought and a guard of six thousand men thereby left. These had themselves after the fall of their tribes many years long with their neighbours struck, by attacking soon, soon against assaults defended themselves, and with a peace treaty according to all-round agreement to the domicile selected this area. All ways lead to Rome An existing gallic road-map can be accepted, the Roman troops used it in their ways. The camp s can to be assumed at strategically important way-crossing or ford over a waters. On these points, the Romans could control the trading and human sources. The Roman advance followed river courses, which led into the enemy's country. October 54 v. Chr. First day First act The 15 Roman Cohortes, divided in two units to one Legion and a half Legion under the instruction of 2 Legates Cotta and Sabinus, settled in the master area of the Eburones. After 14 days of presence, appeared some Gallic warriors at the camp and attacked this. What Legate what unit ruled, is not delivered. But Sabinus had larger right to talk and it’s him,the debt at the following disaster was given. The attack of the gallic Eburones on the Roman winter camp of the Sabinus was struck back by Roman cavallery. That permits the careful conclusion, that not the entire eburonean armed force attacked the camp, but only one part, about 1/4 of the gallic crews; the full Eburonean forces could have forced the roman cavallery (no more than 400 riders under weapons, possibly however less) and they would have made no impact. Perhaps an illusion of wrong facts, in order to lead the Romans into a deceitful security of the superiority. The eburonean federations faced themselves for the first time with the high standard of the Roman weapons and discipline. Roman Legionaers have been elite soldiers; specialist and expensively in the training. A war leader of the Eburones, by his speeches and acts (of the Eburones) excellent man named Ambiorix, led the word of the following negotiations with the Romans troups. Here, the author of the b. G. ist getting novelful, more fantasyful. From where and from whom the literal events are this two days from 54 b.C. occupied, if nevertheless in the following almost all, which participated in combat on Roman side, died? The author of the b. G. knew in for instance the process of the events and the result. 3. Peripetie (reversal of the luck circumstances of the hero) The action reaches its high point (Climax). October 54 v. Chr. Second day Second act In the following night, the guidance of the Sabinus camp decided the course back due to an ultimatum on the part of the Eburonen to move away in the morning-grey of the coming day, full-armed and with long unit train. This ultimatum contained the garanted free departure of the Legion Sabinus to the west from the master area of the Eburonean tribe. The next Roman camp Cicero should be attainable in 2 days. 4. Retardation (slowing down) Falling action - with retardierenden (dilatory, delaying, slowing down) moments. The action slows down, over in a phase of the highest tension on the forthcoming disaster in addition-works. The average days' march achievement of a Legion amounted to about 20 - 25 km. On engagements conditions could be carried out to 40 km. The Legion Sabinus decided to arrive in two days' marches at one of the next camps (removed between 75 and 90 km) and started with daylight beginning (at the end of of Octobers: 0700 h summer time). Roman combat forces unfolded their largest combat capability on an open, free terrain with the possibility of a substantial employment of the Cohortes. A Cohorte forms a unit of approximately 500 armed men (desired strength). Several Cohortes form graduated rows in the battle, depending upon conditions and combat capability, differently. The march formation of the taking-off consisted according to standard of scouts, consisting of riders, pioneers and more easily infantry, then the infantry, following the unit train and the back. The length of the course is indicated as “very long”; a side-protection is possible, however not described, equally nothing is occupied over the otherwise usual method of the taking of hostages on the part of the Romans at prominent Galliards. These practices should be accepted (or did not take place in this case). Choice of a engagements place or: The set of the large Showdown Sabinus must have had reasons making the march into the “large” valley. Either the march objective gave this (for both bearings at the beginning leaving identically?), or a alternate for still more unfavorable march area forced this. The native Eburoneans possessed very good knowledge of the combat area, what can be expected. Short term placing of eburonean combat forces at the prospective march direction, which they could recognize only on the base to trick the Roman march column in the morning of combat, was a venture. The Roman troops organised themselves for the remainder the night, packed all necessary and was available before morning-grey in march direction, in long course and large unit train. These movements increased fire activities, marching-up, preparations for shipment, scouts, pioneers, signals and the direction of the march resulting from it were observed by the Eburones. Where does the child fall into the well? The author of the b. G. mentions, vaguely, which of the both bearings was the goal of the Sabinus march. The next = Cicero in the area of the Nervians = 75 km! There is 50% a chance, which was it the Labienus camp in the area of the Treverians, thus the longer way = approx. 90 km! The author of the b. G. could only assume, that the leaving to the next camp, i.e. the camp Cicero, applied. Caesar puts this assumption into the reader mouth. But the place of coming combat seemed to lie into this direction. The march direction of the Romans must have been so clearly, which was compelling only to be a certain way for the march. The time of the attack should take place as fast as possible. If the Romans would have gone into another direction, than that the Eburones assumed, the combat forces of the Eburones could not have reacted flexibly enough in shortness of time to the new situation and an attack would have been a too high risk. Length of the train In the march, discipline is required. The Roman military used no cars in the Gallic War for transport of luggage, excluding Mules. This permits the use of narrow passport ways. It made the Legion more mobile and more independent in difficult and unknown area. The noisy performance on the march must have been substantial: galloping alarm units, crying Mules, roaring drivers, instructions, singing Legionaers. The Mules bucked, shit and a slidy flight corridor trampled, which had to use the back. Standard has been four infantrymen in the member, with a meter distance to the next row. Horses too third next to each other. Other constellations could result. The average march achievement of an infantry troop per hour amounts to about 5 km. Leaving was 0700 h (morning-grey) summer time. If the Legion Sabinus had marched about 0600 o'clock at an earlier time, it must be considered, that is was still very dark (daylight beginning approximately against 0715 o'clock) and it would have been dificult for the Eburones to recognize and attack the opponent. Length of the infantry with a meter distance in the member, results in (approx.) 5,500 men infantry in the three-member 2.000m. 5,500 men infantry in the two-member 3.000m. 7,500 men infantry in the three-member 3.000m. 7,500 men infantry in the two-member 4.000m. For the unit train, plus officers/horses/Train, for instance half of the length of the entire infantry 5,500 men infantry/unit train in the three-member 3.000m, 5,500 men infantry/unit train in the two-member 4.000m. 7,500 men infantry/unit train in the three-member 4.000m, 7,500 men infantry/unit train in the two-member 6.000m. An average value of at least 3 km, at the most 6 km course length over all can be accepted. Time of the attack The attack of the Eburonen began for instance between 0800 h and 0900 h. Engagements duration up to the respected hour, on the basis of Central European time calculation 0800 to 1500 o'clock, thus about 7 hours. The combat or: Through this hollow lane they must come down. Main combat might not have taken place rather around the center of the course, depending upon area, however at the end, at the head or within the range of the unit train. A main attack goal of the Eburones was clearly the Roman infantry at a place unfavorable for the romans and favorable for the Eburonean. The Eburones will simply not have selected the unit train as a main attack goal. From data of the author of the b. G., standards can be created: a whole Legion, a half Legion, the unit train and the camp. The main attack and the main battlefield possibly remove three kilometers of the camp. The Roman crews will have marched after units. These are designated: 1 = the half Legion, 2 = the whole Legion, 3 = the unit train, results in these components six possible march variations: A) 1 2 3 B) 1 3 2 C) 2 3 1 D) 2 1 3 E) 3 2 1 F) 3 1 2 The versions E and F are to be excluded, the unit train were not in front led. Remaining A, B, C and D. from a certain logic, point A and D to be excluded likewise, because the unit train became as secured as possible, which with A = 1 2 3 and D = 2 1 3 is not the case. Remain B and C. The complete Legion “2” was new, the half legion had experience. So more experienced troops led the train.Thus version B with the march formation 1 3 2. Since 2 like 1 must be twice as long, relative sizes result. The course length can be: In the case of version B 1/5=1, 2/5=3, 2/5=2. If the course should have had a length over everything of approximately 5 km (which is quite realistic), this 1=1 km, 3=2 km and 2=2 km. If this course in its whole length was 1 km from the camp and if the main attack would have taken place at the formation B between the segment 3 and 2, in a distance of 3 km of the camp, this would be about 2 Roman miles. Accepted, the Eburonen would have stationed its crews evenly at the flanks of the Roman army course. However with 2 km length of the Roman infantry the whole length would have been 4 km long. That is not realistic. The Eburones did not want to provoke an open field battle. This would be lost by them. Why a good tacticianas Ambiorix attacks a weapon-moderately and better trained army course in one such way? Did he want actually a complete victory or only a fast attack with a rapid retreat? 5. Disaster or Lysis/Dénouement A) It comes to the disaster b) All conflicts are solved Leaves were still at the trees at the end of of October, it has been relative dry according to b. G. About the weather on these two days, whether for instance rains, nebulas or sun prevailed, nothing is reported. Advantages to the Eburones was the choice of the area and a surprising attack. The infantry marched in full equipment (approximately up to 30 kg) and was relieved of their normal luggage. Sabinus wanted to carry about 80 km in two days , a daily performance of 40 km, at the end of the day they had to build up a new march camp. The army course of the Sabinus was attacked about 1 hour after excerpt from the camp by the Eburones in three places. First of all: the train. It carried the private property, the goal of the desertion beginning was during the attack. The combat developed itself in the course of approximately 7 hours to the favour of the Eburones. How does the farmer get the cow from the ice? The attempt of a surrender on the part of the roman legion guidance led to the death of the Roman Parlamentareans including the legate of Sabinus and a number of his guidance officers. 15 roman cohortes were struck, a remainder made some retreat into the roman camp and committed at the following night a complete suicide. Why did the Romans, at the end of lost combat, gain a retreat into the camp? How many humans have it been? Why did the Eburones triumph so completely? The Romans have been professionals in war. Why did they lost in such a strong way? The author of the b. G. (who should prove himself), positives the report of the combat into a way relatively bearable for Rome, without treating the embarrassing defeat in more details. The losses on roman side can be accepted with approximately 6,000 dead. The few survivors of Romans escaped directly from the battle (and not from the camp) and fled to the camp Labienus (!), none to Cicero, otherwise these would have experienced from the exit of combat! If a part of the Roman troops had reached the camp and could defend it , we must concern a minimum occupation. In the case of approximately 700 x 1.000m, all two meters a Legionaer about 1,600 Legionäre, that is a fifth of the entire estimated Sabinus Legion. Therefore about 4,000 could have died in combat. Whether these still living 1,600 Legionaeres (more or less) would have committed collective mass suicide, was undecided. That would exceed Masada. (Notes of the author: None of the camp survived: is the history of the eagle carrier, that threw the legion eagle banner over the barrier, in order to die fighting, true? Who reported that? All were nevertheless dead.) October 54 b.C. autumn/winter 54/53 b.C. Vae victis If in a combat like this, an opposing side broke through the hostile lines, the fight is decided. Panic, demoralization and escape on side of the defeated are the result. High losses result from killing the wounded ones and killing the fleeing. Antique battles took usually only one day and were then decided. There were made no prisoner on the part of the Gallics. Whereto with the corpse? To the battleground and the Roman camp happened thorough plunderings. What remained lying over the year was bones, small articles from iron, pieces of metal, into the soil were throwing-stones of each forms can be added. Weapons and arms may no more to be assumed. There must have been a strong smell over the place of the meeting, because the Gallics will not have buried the Roman dead soldiers. The following winter 54/53 b.C. retarded the decay of the bodies. When Roman troops came back one year later, they will have permitted a honorable treatment to the found mortal remnants of their soldiers. At least two concentrations of dead should have to be expected to: the dead of the engagements place and of the Roman winter camp. A secondary use happened to the camp, therefore no funeral is to be expected there. Usual funeral ceremony was those of burning. 6000 burned skeletons let traces. Possible fire-pure in a certain place, which contain still bone material, could be a further reference to a today's identification and regulation. Also the Eburones will have suffered substantial losses in the combat. A tribe, whose main acquisition has been agriculture and who only had a certain number of men able to work, couldn’t affort replaceable losses from perhaps 2,000 to 3,000 Eburones. Additional losses came with the engagements into consequence around the camp Cicero, in whom the Eburones likewise participated. Did the losses become so high, that the Eburones couldn’t resist any more war? To that extent the Roman troops would have had easy play with the “elimination” of this tribe one year later. That means by them to destroy the economic bases. The coming winter made the remainder. The culture-horizons of late-ironage findings in the Rhineland interrupted in 50 b.C.: in Düren/Winden, in Niederzier/Hambach and in Euskirchen/Kreuzweingarten. The tribe of the Eburones as an political and ethnical group didn't exist any longer. Epilog Summary or: Where is the corpse? There must be a place in the Euregio, that corresponds with the b. G. writings. It should be possible, without coincidence finds, however due to the data of the report from the b. G. and a good local knowledge of the area, to locate and find Atuatuca. Many cities in France and a city in Germany lead the principal place of a celtic tribe in their name, like Paris = Parisii, Reims = Remii, Trier = Treverians etc. Why shouldn’t there be a city in the Euregio, which sounds similar as Eburon/Ebron, thus the head office of the Eburones? Possible explanation: The Eburones did not possess cities/Oppidae and have been destroyed so radical from geographical and political map, rubbed out, that no trace is to be found. In addition those embarrassing defeats 54 and 53 b.C. near Atuatuca. After these events in 54/53 b.C. the winter camp probably has been given up and turned out (or “taboo”). It hasn’t been in B-Tongeren. We need: 1. A highland (the Camp) 2. A celtic attachment (the Atuatuca) 3. A “large” lower (in 3 km distance from the camp). All three components are to find in a small landscape of about 3 x 3 km. The geographical centre of Eburonian tribe settlement area is the area round D-Jülich and this is 300 km (150 RM) off from F-Amiens (Samarobriva). This distance could be done by a march of about 20 km the day. If the legions Sabinus and Cicero would have done their coming together (F-Amiens, B-Mons, B-St.Truiden) and the two armies seperated themselves after the arrival of the Legion Cicero in Nervian grounds and Sabinus marched eastward, it is to assume, that the Legion Sabinus was coming from the west (B-St.Truiden, NL-Maastricht/Caster, D-Jülich - or B-Lüttich, B-Eupen, D-Jülich) and Sabinus knew, where and in the which distance the Legion Cicero was to be found westward. The fords over River Maas are to be found at B-Lüttich and NL-Maastricht. All three legates (Labienus, Cicero, Sabinus) knew their relative distance to each other! The distances given from the b. G. between the camps Labienus, Sabinus and Cicero must be accepted as reality (there are no alternatives). Based of the D-Jülich area, camp Labienus (90 km) could be in the area B-Bastogne and camp Cicero (75 km) in the area B-St.Truiden. Bastogne - St.Truiden (90 km). Probably the camp Cicero hasn’t been south of the river Maas. If one of the components round “Atuatuca” is found, the other places should be nearby, and/or within the delivered distance! The castellum Atuatuca, which mentions the b. G., is the point of interest. A castellum, large enough and actually not to survey, a Roman Camp and a valley as the combat place in the surroundings. Without these three fitting components, none gets ahead. All three components must fit together. It’s not guilty, if one point seems to be found and the two others dare somewhere in the proximity. This is, why it makes it so dificult. A fight against three windmills. Striking proofs are datable coins and military findings from the time before 54 b.C. Wrong tracks: The actual foolness of romans troops, to react in favour to the Gallics in just all tactical decisions. The finally not detectable strength of the Legion respectively it resulting length in the course. What is a “big” valley? No existence of a small gallic fortification in the area of D-Jülich. No caesarean artifacts in the area concerned. Famous last words: The northern gallic tribes did observed the distribution of the roman legions in the autumn 54 b.C. Possible, that the Trevereans led a rebellion to isolate the eastern roman winter camps and attack them. The Treverean Indutiomarus could be considered as head of the rebellion and worked out for the first time a politically and masterspreading rebellion in northern Gallia. The communication links and supplying lines of the Romans have been interrupted. Those Eburones, actually small denominators in this calculation, had, by circumspection and tactical projecting ability and good timing, defeated the roman army. They wrote European history in these two days. Who extracts the suggestion of the b. g., can recognize that something went wrong and/or wrong decisions were made by the roman army in autumn 54 b.C.: 1. Too far apart convenient winter camps, 2. Organization of the Intelligence, neither the Legates among themselves, nor the contact to the Army command, nor the Army command to the Legates had good connections, which must have been necessary. 3. Masking the commanders responsibility for the defeat of Atuatuca by giving all debts to Sabinus. A relatively logical and simple solution of the combat could be this: A tribe like the Eburones needed a general mobilization to attack the winter camp of Sabinus. This period probably took two weeks in requirement. The meeting place of the Gallics is to be found in the proximity of the fortress Atuatuca. This place was well known by the Eburones. Those Eburones had to know, where they used their men to attack, when the attacks took place and how many men have been wanted by the attacks. They couldn’t have planned it by one moment. They needed coordinated staff meetings of the leading-officers and these needed a absolute loyalty to their chief-leader. It would have been very difficult to move all those eburonian armed forces in such a short time during the ultimatum (half night) in the darkness and so precisely to the points of attack. The Eburones knew the incoming way of the Legion Sabinus. This same way, the romans would have done again by her march back. The way to the camp Labienus was unknown by Sabinus. The Eburones knew all about the roman troops, even the manpower and the forces to make a combat. The Romans didn’t knew much about the Eburones! Based of this calculation the Eburones planned a trick, which only works if the Roman would come out of their fortress. What did the Eburones had to lose? Everything! The day before the ambush, the Eburones put 3/4 of their men into a close place not far to the camp (2 RM) in the known backmarching way. What could happen to the Romans, to move away from the camp? Presupposed, the connecting lines of the Romans were interrupted and Sabinus couldn’t send messages to Cicero and Labienus. The Eburones attacked the camp Sabinus with 1/4 of their forces. Efficiently making noise, real dead people. Roman cavallery disengaged and reduced this rather slight attack. What will be the consequence of this attack? The Sabinus guidance would have thought: that was all, the Eburones can afford, none is coming more, otherwise they all would have been there to attack the camp. What a poor tribe. Plan B follows: Parlamentarians of the Eburones come out and talk their sentence: all three easternmost roman camps will be contemporaneous attacked, still Teutons are added, thus: free departure granted to the next camp, save Cicero or what can be saved and leave us alone. Sabinus must consider: These Eburones so small and weakly; a joke of asking such consequences: but if it’s true? Wouldn't they have attacked the camp? This was some courage of despair. If the camp Cicero actually has been attacked by a large tribe like the Nervians, Cicero would have real problems. But moving away without express instructions of the Roman commander in chief? He is far away, perhaps even in Rome. The calculation of the Eburones solved: the Legion Sabinus moved in dawn, after a long back and forth of discussions. What did the Romans had to loose? In disregarding the ultimatum by the romans, the Eburones would have attacked the roman camp probably in their full men power, whereby here the surprising effect would have been more present, but on the other side the Romans however would have been in a better defense position. The Eburones divided half of their tribe into two main groups of even 1/4 of their men at a distance of approximately two roman miles off the Sabinus camp beside a valley. One contingent of 1/4 of men was placed in approximately 6 km distance from the camp on the height of a valley, the other 1/4 of Eburones remained at the Roman camp in a waiting position. The romans might have thought, that these few men wouldn’t attack the camp one more time, nor the marching train. In a long course, maybe only 3 legionaires in a row, without protecting the sides, the romans went off with very long unit train into a large valley. The equipment of the legionaires had not much to do with our nowadays image of these soldiers in books and reenactment groups. Sword and pilum, perhaps helmet, a possibly mixture of roman-republican arms and some gallic equipments. Chain shirts might have been very rare. The caesarean legions in Gallia didn’t got supply from the roman homeland for a long time. At the time of the Atuatuca combat many roman legionairs already had been in field for 4 years, without leaving Gallia for a holiday. Maybe this explains the despaired attempt of many roman soldiers to save their respective private property from the unit train. Fighters on both sides, except perhaps the officers and centuriones, have been fitted very similar. The Eburones let the course the roman legion unimpaired into the valley and began the ambush at three points. The main attack of eburonean infantry took place three kilometers outside of the camp. The remaining Eburonen at the roman camp fall thereupon in the back of the roman army course, directly and surprisingly for the Romans. This would explain a lot, e.g. why the Eburones attacked so nearby the camp. The attack should have been coordinated by signals, maybe fires. This needed a clear day and the view on signal fires from at least three positions. The coming attack put everything to a sudden stop. Because of a bad area structure (wood, sump, brook?) the legion didn’t had a chance, to form their often trained battle-lines with the 15 cohortes. The situation of the Romans worsened, as parts of roman infantry left their combat units to secure their owneries, whereby panic and desertion was developed. Assumed, those Eburones planned “only”, to separate the unit train from the Roman army course to regard this as their booty. Further accepted, the fight developed in such a favourably way for the Gallics, that the Romans thought, the announced Teutons had been present and this all developed in a general panic, released by very unfavorable area, untrained troops and more, which led on the one hand to a escaping movement to the camp, on the other hand to separated concentrations of individual cohortes on different locations in a certain range, but always in way to the camp. That means: within a circle of 3 km round the roman camp, the battleground is to be found. Why the Romans failed in such manner? The area did not offer an opportunity to insure the left and right of the course. Was it too swampy, that the heavy cavallery wasn’t able to fight? The place, at which Sabinus with his men has been attacked, wasn’t a good place for fighting. Maybe there have been valuable things in the unit train, perhaps weapons? All this favoured the tactical advantages for the Gallic. They forced the Romans to fight in a certain place: that one the Gallic pre-determined. The Romans formed, under leaving its luggage, a circle. A technology, that Roman war guidance called “orbis”, which was used in case of retreat. From this circle broke out individual cohortes and fought against the Eburones. This point is important. The main attack took place about 3 km (2 Roman miles) outside of the camp and tactically not on the unit train. The Roman troops moved from that disadvantageous areas out on a better combat field, forming thereby a circle with an option of the retreat to the camp. The battlefield could not have been so small. What size makes a circle of 15 cohortes? Cohortes broke out individually out of the circle and turned back. Assumed, such a circle has about a diameter of 250m. Again approx. 100 to 150m for the losses. Results a diameter of for instance 400m, plus the Eburones = 500m. For instance, by putting all forces of the eburones on the roman circle and not getting the free booty, they managed to defeat the romans in an open forest, maybe swampy, by fighting in a guerilla-tactic-like combat over some 7 hours. Some romans reached the camp, but couldn’t hold it, because they were not enough men. They killed themselves in the following night. Probably they have been more than 1000 men. This seems strange. Maybe the tribes of the Nervians, Atuatucans and Eburones tried the same trick, that worked in Atuatuca, in front of the Cicero camp (who hasn’t been informed about the Sabinus defeat). This, because of the resistance from Cicero, failed. The fortress of the Atuatucan tribe could be B-Liège. In these circumstances, Ambiorix and its people would have come from D-Aachen/Jülich over B-Herve to B-Lüttich to meet the Atuatucans, from there northwesten to B-St.Truiden to meet the Nervians and together they attacked Ciceros camp. All this seems very similar to a script of an american film: All acting persons were introduced, devided into the good ones and bad ones. Something terrible happens and who is the murder? Mostly in this case, a woman rises up, but this will be the leading archaeologist. Everyone can persume, who the murderer is and how everything took place. This is the trick in american cinema, that everyone can persume, suspect, imagine etc. The murder is always a wellknown actor. Otherwise the company wouldn’t have payed such a lot of money for such a small set. Caesar acts like a film director: He let us suspect, what really happened, but he is writing something different. Very clever, this Caesar. A tough and mean american (film director) he would have been in our days. And this is nearly all, we do know about Atuatuca. The facts on finding it somewhere under the rainbow, however, are all in favour of the Maas-Rhineland. Hartmut Albrecht was born in 1954. He still lives in D-Stolberg/Rhineland (nearby Cologne) and is autor of these pages. In Atsch (a corner of his small cottage), where he is still living and working, some «Ambiorix» came over him: actually, this region is discussed to be the battleground of Atuatuca; troops of eburonian Celts and roman troops had some strange fightings there, written down by Sir C.I.Caesar in his BG (V, 24-38). But nothing is to be found until today, not in the Netherlands, nor in Belgium, neither in Germany. H. Albrecht had done a bad continental-english-translation about the scenery. His English is not as good as Caesars (see upstairs). But who cares?. Thanks so much for your interest. It would be an honor and a pleasure, to communicate with you. Yours sincerely and faithfully Hartmut Albrecht More about celts >>onownrisk  ©2010 | Atuatuca | Si non è vero, è ben trovato! |
